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Editorial  
There is an Antipodean theme to this, the fifth issue of the Journal in its new guise. As 
editors, we were delighted that a paper published in the fourth issue provoked a 
reaction from the President of the Tribunal whose work was under scrutiny. Christopher 
Maylea and Christopher James Ryan’s article ‘Decision-Making Capacity and the 
Victorian Mental Health Tribunal’ ([2017] International Journal of Mental Health and 
Capacity Law  87) had proposed an interpretation of how the Mental Health Act 2014 
in Victoria, Australia, should work, before turning to two empirical studies which 
analysed the decisions of the Statements of Reasons of the Victoria Mental Health 
Tribunal to gain some appreciation of how the Act was working. Maylea and Ryan 
argued that the Tribunal had an obligation to consider the assessment of a compulsory 
patient’s decision-making capacity when determining whether or not to make a 
compulsory Treatment Order, and that the Tribunal was falling into error by not 
meeting this positive obligation to take this matter into consideration.   
 
The President of the Tribunal, Matthew Carroll, in a rejoinder published in this issue, 
suggests that this criticism was based on: a fundamental misinterpretation of relevant 
law, a misunderstanding of the processes of the Tribunal, and a lack of sufficient 
recognition of the distinctive features of the legislation that establishes the Tribunal 
and its processes. Carroll further suggests that Maylea and Ryan generated a 
misconception that by not focusing on their decision-making capacity, the perspectives 
of mental health consumers are not being considered as part of Tribunal hearings in 
Victoria.  
 
So as not to leave readers in suspense, this issue also contains a response by Maylea 
and Ryan, to the effect, broadly, that the President’s understanding of the way that the 
Tribunal should operate is understandable, but does not, in their view, reflect the best 
reading of the legislation. Many may wish to follow their suggestion of returning to the 
analysis presented in their original paper and review it in light of Carroll’s criticism. 
Should the President wish to continue the debate, the pages of the Journal are firmly 
open, and the editors would be delighted to facilitate further debate on what is 
undeniably a very important, yet perhaps, penumbrous topic within the Tribunal 
jurisdiction.  
 
Next is a stimulating article by Bennetts, Maylea, McKenna and Makregiorgos on the 
‘tricky dance’ of advocacy, a study of non-legal mental health advocacy in Victoria, 
Australia. The article serves the useful purpose both of reviewing some of the 
underpinning drivers and models of advocacy in the context of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’), and describing the application of the model 
of non-legal representational advocacy within the Victorian context, drawing on in-
depth qualitative interviews with advocates and other key stakeholders. The authors 
state that this is not an evaluation of this model or its impact, but rather a descriptive 
illustration of its intent and approach. This is exactly the sort of illustration which is 
required to flesh out what can otherwise become sterile exchanges of slogans.   
 
We then have a review paper by Piers Gooding on recent United Nations activity 
concerning Article 19 CRPD. As Gooding highlights, Article 19 produces an unusual 
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consensus: “commentators across the spectrum – from those who see a role for 
coercion and substituted decision-making, to those who think they should be eliminated 
– appear to agree on the need for more resources for people with intellectual, cognitive 
and psychosocial disabilities to exercise their right to live independently and participate 
in the community.” In the personal experience of one of the editors (Ruck Keene) on 
the independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales under way 
at the time of writing, this consensus is not merely shared by commentators, but also 
by those seeking to take forward law reforms in this area. Gooding’s article, therefore, 
serves the invaluable purpose of placing the recent ‘General Comment’ No. 5 (August 
2017) on Article 19 in its context, summarising its content, and critically analysing its 
key provisions. 
Remaining focused on the CRPD, the final paper relates to an entirely different part of 
the world and is a valuable spotlight on a jurisdiction based on a mixture of civil law 
and Shari’a law. Patricia Cuenca Gómez, María del Carmen Barranco Avilés and Pablo 
Rodríguez del Pozo review the provisions of Qatari law relating to deprivation of liberty 
in the context of psychosocial disability in the light of the CRPD. They find the provisions 
substantially lacking, and propose reforms to ensure that persons with psychosocial 
disabilities enjoy the right to liberty on equal terms with others. 
We are grateful to the peer reviewers for their prompt and thorough comments, 
the proofreading assistance provided by Hal (Zhan) Brinton of the University of Leeds,  
the ongoing support of the library staff of Northumbria University, and the overall 
guidance provided by Kris Gledhill as the IJMHCL Editor-in-Chief. 
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